

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### 2.1 Theory of Literature

The name of the label, sign, and someone with others (Hofman 1993) or certain communities (Lehrer 1999). Thus, one name only 260 Sahid Teguh Widodo, Nuraini Yussof & Hisham Dzakiria may refer to a person as an individual sake only, however with easily found a name used for a lot of people.

The name may also be seen as a social product coz each social groups likely to have the characteristics of names differed as a result of differing cultural rather than development. Java, as an island rich diversity of cultural traditions of the nation, not so much if only the form and meaning of the name forms.

However, rather than historical perspective, this diversity should know form an independent and intact than the name. So now, the investigation on behalf of the Javanese always view than a single paradigm sake only.

Name seen as form of speech than investigations that have been done, resulting in the listing name Javanese people are elected and the best sake only. That is why Hofmann (1993), Cavallaro (2004), and even Uhlenbeck (1982) though expressed study on behalf of the Javanese are very narrow, dry, and less attractive.

Based on the statement above, this paper intends to examine diversity elements of Javanese name, trademark with form and meaning. The main purpose of this study than in addition to going to know the various forms of syntactic and semantic behavior than the Javanese name, also seeks to unravel the patterns of

thinking, patterns of expectations, desires, aspirations, and other circumstances in the context of the study name. In addition, an understanding of the diversity element Javanese name is expected to contribute knowledge would dynamism of contemporary Javanese society to contemporary.

## **2.2 What is Language and Discourse?**

Language it is a tangible symbol system sounds or sounds as a symbol of course said, of course there are symbolized then it is a notion, a concept, an idea, or an idea to be conveyed in the form of sound. Because of the emblems that refers to something concepts, ideas, or thought, it can be said that the language has meaning. Symbols of the meaningful sounds of language in the form of language units tangible language morpheme, word, phrase, clause, sentence, and discourse of all the units that have meaning. However, because there are differences in the level, it was not the same kind of meaning. Meaning with respect to morpheme and word are called lexical meanings: regarding the phrase, clause, and sentence called grammatical meaning: and with respect to meaning is called pragmatic discourse context or meaning. (Larson, R. and Segal, G. 1995)

Because language is meaningful then any words that have no meaning can be called not the language. So, once again forms a non-significant sound of any language is not the language, because the function of language is to convey a message, concept, idea, or thought. Name is a reflection of your self. (cf. Grice, 1957)and (Keraf, 1984:16), that old man used to say when giving a name to his son. Hopefully with a good name that has meaning to reflect the nature of the child's future. But basically the name of a person is only an identity, not as it says

above. Not necessarily someone will have good properties when it gets a good name when he was born and given the name by his parents.

Today the literature on self roster is pretty much available. However, still little effort toward self-description name as part of the grammatical structure of the language (Wibowo, 2001:45).

Thus the author would like to try to assess further the name of self-referent analysis is the formation of a search for the word on the grounds that the name itself may arise from linguistic events as well.

Also write a good name is one of the obligation of parents to son than as a motivation in confidence the eternal after life. The name is the identity of which was brought to the angel called her charity countdown tomorrow when given charity records. (Gottlob, Frege, Bertrand)

### **2.3 Meaning and Sentences**

Today the literature on self roster is pretty much available. However, still little effort toward self-description name as part of the grammatical structure of the language. Some common linguistic problems, such as the nature and position of semantically proper name proper name of the common nouns, has attracted the attention of many linguists and philosophy (Uhlenbeck, 1982:370).

For most linguists study of proper names is a field of research is thin and less hopeful that the relief given to science onomastic, in the meantime, what is the proper name is the word used to refer to a person (Ali in Riyadi, 1999:80; conf. Kridalaksana, 1993: 144).

In other words, the name can be interpreted as a word that serves as a

designation to show people or as a marker of one's identity. In light of the language of science, the name itself is a lingual unit that can be called as a sign. The sign is a combination of the concept (signified) and form (written or spoken) or marker (Saussure, 1988:147). The signs - which among others called the conventional mark symbol - plays an important role in communication (Sudjiman and Zoest, 1996b: 9). Thus, the proper name in addition to functioning as a marker of identity, can also be a symbol, such as True 'firm / solid' than an identity marker of a man, is also a symbol of strength. In addition, Palupi 'exemplary' in addition to being a marker of a woman's identity, is also a symbol of exemplary.

To see the distinction between semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning, it may help to consider an analogous one. Imagine an anthropologist specializing in table manners sent out to observe a distant tribe. One task the anthropologist clearly might undertake is to simply describe the table manners of that tribe—to describe the different categories into which members of the tribe place actions at the table, and to say which sorts of actions fall into which categories. This would be analogous to the task of the philosopher of language interested in semantics; her job is say what different sorts of meanings expressions of a given language have, and which expressions have which meanings. (DavidLewis 1970, 19).

Accordingly, one sort of approach of foundational theories of meaning is simply to deny that there is any true foundational theory of meaning. One might be quite willing to endorse one of the semantic theories outlined above while also a symbol of exemplary. (David Lewis 1970. 19)

## 2.4 Theory of Meaning

Perhaps the most influential current approach in the contemporary theory of meaning is that sketched by Donald Davidson in his introduction to the collection of essays *Truth and Meaning* in 1967. There he argued for the following two theses:

- Any learnable language must be stable in a finite form, even if it is of a theoretically infinite number of expressions—as we may assume that natural human languages are, at least in principle. If it could not be stated in a finite way then it could not be learned through a finite, empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages. It follows that it must be possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural language which could give the meanings of an infinite number of sentences on the basis of a finite system of axioms.
- Giving the meaning of a sentence, he further argued, was equivalent to stating its *truth conditions*. He proposed that it must be possible to account for language as a set of distinct grammatical features together with a lexicon, and for each of them explain its workings in such a way as to generate trivial (obviously correct) statements of the truth conditions of all the (infinitely many) sentences built up from these.

In this case, following Uhlenbeck (1982:373-382), whose proper name merely serve is entity markers identical to the names themselves are not self-motivated, if the name that serves as a symbol synonymous with the name of self-motivated. Other than that, Budiwati (2000) alludes Happenings link between proper name and reference. Semantically proper name can be associated with variable reference(reference varied) and these constant reference (constant

reference). That is, within the scope of the shape of the shorter sentences displayed the name of a person he has a tendency to have a reference that is varied, while the longer one's name appear in the sentence the more likely he has a permanent reference. In that regard, Ryle (in Wasiyati, 2000:8) states that the name has a referent but have no meaning. Symbolic Meaning of names and other words built by conventions that are specific to certain culture . Also emphasized that the dictionary does not reveal the meaning of the names of the simple reason, namely because the name does not mean anything.

**2.5 Searle, (1985:24) in Malcolm Coulthrad develops the illocutionary acts into five types, there are as follows:**

**2.5.1 Representatives**

The illocutionary acts is that in which the meaning expresses his belief that the propositional content of the utterance is true. Acts of asserting, predicting, describing, advising, certifying, admitting and agreeing are all instances of the speakers expressing his attitude of BELIEVE. However, as we might expect, within this genus of representatives, there are a number of species and sub-species involving conditions surrounding the cause and basis of belief on the part of the meaning.

**2.5.2 Directives**

The illocutionary acts which are all attempts by the meaningto get the hearer to do something; in this class the meaning WANTS to achieve a future situation in which the world will match his word. Includes those acts in which the meaning expressed an attitude towards a prospective action by the hearer. Acts

such as pleading, requesting, ordering and suggesting all fall within this genus of which, again, there are a proper name of species.

### **2.5.3 Commissive**

Illocutionary act which expresses his intentions concerning some future action. There are two main species. The point is to commit the meaning himself to acting and it necessarily involves INTENTION.

### **2.5.4 Expressive**

Illocutionary act which the meaning expresses his attitude towards some earlier action. As example he offer 'thank', apologize and deplore

## **2.6 Two Kinds of Theory of Meaning**

In "General Semantics," David Lewis wrote I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. (Lewis 1970, 19)

To see the distinction between semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning, it may help to consider an analogous one. Imagine an anthropologist specializing in table manners sent out to observe a distant tribe. One task the anthropologist clearly might undertake is to simply describe the table manners of that tribe—to describe the different categories into which members of the tribe place actions at the table, and to say which sorts of actions fall into which categories. This would be analogous to the task of the philosopher of language

interested in semantics; her job is say what different sorts of meanings expressions of a given language have, and which expressions have which meanings. (Cappelen, H., and LePore, E., 2005, *Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic*).

But our anthropologist might also become interested in the nature of manners; he might wonder how, in general, one set of rules of table manners comes to be the system of etiquette governing a particular group. Since presumably the fact that a group obeys one system of etiquette rather than another is traceable to something about that group, the anthropologist might put his new question by asking, ‘In virtue of what facts about a person or group does that person or group come to be governed by a particular system of etiquette, rather than another?’ Our anthropologist would then have embarked upon the analogue of the construction of a foundational theory of meaning: he would then be interested, not in which etiquette-related properties particular action types have in a certain group, but rather the question of how action-types can, in any group, come to acquire properties of this sort. Our anthropologist might well be interested in both sorts of questions about table manners; but they are, pretty clearly, different questions. Just so, semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning are, pretty clearly, different sorts of theories (Davidson, 1967).

The term ‘theory of meaning’ has, in the recent history of philosophy, been used to stand for both semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning. As this has obvious potential to mislead, in what follows I’ll avoid the term which this article is meant to define and stick instead to the more specific ‘semantic theory’ and ‘foundational theory of meaning’. ‘Theory of meaning’ *simplicity* is to be

understood as ambiguous between these two interpretations (Quine, 1960 and Kripke, 1982).

Before turning to discussion of these two sorts of theories, it is worth noting that one prominent tradition in the philosophy of language denies that there are facts about the meanings of linguistic expressions. (Quine 1960 and Kripke 1982; Soames, 1999) If this sort of skepticism about meaning is correct, then there is neither a true semantic theory nor a true foundational theory of meaning to be found, since the relevant sort of facts simply are not around to be described or analyzed. Discussion of these skeptical arguments is beyond the scope of this entry, so in what follows I'll simply assume that skepticism about meaning is false.

### **2.6.1 Semantic Theories**

The task of explaining the main approaches to semantic theory in contemporary philosophy of language might seem to face an in-principle stumbling block. Given that no two languages have the same semantics—no two languages are comprised of just the same words, with just the same meanings—it may seem hard to say how we can say anything about different views about semantics in general, as opposed to views about the semantics of this or that language. This problem has a relatively straightforward solution. (Richard Montague's, 1974)

While it is of course correct that the semantics for English is one thing and the semantics for French something else, most assume that the various natural languages should all have semantic theories of (in a sense to be explained) the same form. The aim of what follows will, accordingly, be to introduce the reader

to the main approaches to natural language semantics—the main views about the right form for a semantics for a natural language to take—rather than a detailed examination of the various views about the semantics of some particular expression. (For some of the latter, see names, descriptions, propositional attitude reports, and natural kinds) (Quine, 1960 and Kripke, 1982)

One caveat before we get started: before a semantic theorist sets off to explain the meanings of the expressions of some language, she needs a clear idea of what she is supposed to explain the meaning of this might not seem to present much of a problem; aren't the bearers of meaning just the sentences of the relevant language, and their parts? This is correct as far as it goes; but the task of explaining what the semantically significant parts of a sentence are, and how those parts combine to form the sentence, is an enterprise which is both far from trivial, and has important consequences for semantic theory. Unfortunately, discussion of theories of this sort, which attempt to explain the logical form, or syntax, of natural language sentences, is well beyond the scope of this entry. As a result, figures like Richard Montague, whose work on syntax and its connection to semantics has been central to the development of semantic theory over the past few decades, are passed over in what follows. (Montague, 1974; Soames 2010)

Most philosophers of language these days think that the meaning of an expression is a certain sort of entity, and that the job of semantics is to pair expressions with the entities which are their meanings. For these philosophers, the central question about the right form for a semantic theory concerns the nature of these entities. Because the entity corresponding to a sentence is called a proposition, I'll call these propositional semantic theories. However, not all

philosophers of language think that the meanings of sentences are propositions, or even believe that there are such things. Accordingly, in what follows, I'll divide the space of approaches to semantics into propositional and non-propositional semantic theories. (Lewis 1970, 19)

## **2.7 What is Proper Name?**

In the case, following Uhlenbeck (1982:372-382), whose proper name merely serve is entity markers identical to the names themselves are not self-motivated, if the name that serves as a symbol synonymous with the name of self-motivated. Other than that, Budiwati(2000) alludes Happening link between proper name and reference. Semantically proper name can be associated with variable reference (reference varied) and these constant reference (constant reference). That is, within the scope of the shape of the shorter sentences displayed the name of a person he has tendency to have a reference that is varied, while the longer one's name appear in the sentence the more likely he has a permanent reference.

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Some items of terminology are defined to avoid misinterpretation;

1. The elocutionary act is the meaning of an utterance, and Javanese proper name. (Austin in [http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/elocutionary act.](http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/elocutionary_act))

2. The illocutionary act is carried out by a meaning making an utterance is the Javanese proper name.
3. Perlocutionary act is a meaning, as viewed at the level of its physiological, inspiring and realized something. (Austin in [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/perlocutionary act.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/perlocutionary_act))