

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter explains and discuss about the theory related to the research. Theory that related of the research is theory of speech act.

#### 2.1 Theory of Speech Act

Language as tool of communication is most important in society. With language, the society can communicate to others without obstacle. Also, they can make a sentence or utterance for someone or something that needs language so that more interesting. Language is just not to the truth or falseness of particular statement. But, language also can do things.

Wood, (2000: 4) states “Austin pointed out a feature of language that is known implicitly by all language users: utterances not only have a certain “meaning” (i.e., they refer to states, persons, events, etc.), they also have force, that is, they are not only about things, they also do things.”

For example: If you in the classroom with your teacher and the whiteboard in the classroom is dirty, then your teacher says “It’s dirty whiteboard!, that is refers to the condition in the classroom. But, in that sentence have intended meaning for the speaker. In this sentence for the speaker, the speaker--in this case the speaker is a teacher— have intended meaning (such as a request for someone or student there to clean up the whiteboard. And the effect the student cleans up the whiteboard. Language also do things in advertisement. For example: “Buy 1 Free 1.” The society think if people buy 1, they will get 1 for free. But, for advertiser the sentence have intended meaning. For advertiser, the sentence

used to invite attention the society to buy a product by give offering. And the effects society buy a product. It's argued if language just not about thing but also language can do 'things.'

In linguistics, language that just about thing but also can do things, it name of speech act. Hurford and Heasley (1983: 232) states that "Speech is action, and that language can actually be used to do thing." In addition, Traugott and Pratt, (1980: 229) states that 'Speech act is an utterance as an act performed by a speaker in a context with respect to and addressed.'

It means that speech act is the language used in the sentence or utterance by the speaker has implicit meaning and implicit purposes to the listener, that is, to do thing. The speaker can do anything he wanted with the language to give something to the listener. Because was argued if language just not about thing and falseness or the truth but language can do thing.

There are two philosophers that related of speech act theory. They are J. L. Austin and John Searle. In book *Discourse Analysis*, Paltridge, (2006: 55) states that "Two influential works in the area of pragmatics, and relevant to the area discourse analysis, are Austin's and Searle argued that language is used to 'do things' other than just refer to the truth or falseness of particular statements." And in discourse analysis has theory of speech act.

In theory of speech act have some categories. They are locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act.

Coulthard, (1985: 18) states that " Having demonstrated that in fact all utterances are performative Austin reconsiders the senses in which 'to say something may be to do something' and concludes that in 'issuing an utterance' a speaker can perform three acts simultaneously: a locutionary act which is the act of saying

something in the full sense of 'say'; an illocutionary act which is an act performed in saying something, the act identified by the explicit performative; and a perlocutionary act, the act performed by or as a result of saying."

Meanwhile, Paltridge, (2006: 55) states that "Austin argued that there are three kinds of act which occur with everything we say. These are the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. The locutionary act refers to the literal meaning of the actual words. The illocutionary act refers to the speaker's intention in uttering the words. The perlocutionary act refers to the effect this utterance has on the thoughts or actions of the other person."

In addition, Chierchia and Ginet, (1990: 171) that "The locutionary act, Austin said, 'is an act of producing a meaningful linguistic expression. An illocutionary act is performed in saying something. And perlocutionary act is what we bring about or achieve by saying something."

According to the theories above, locutionary act is full sense of sentence or utterance. Do not have intended meaning but literal meaning of the own sentence or utterance. Illocutionary act is the act that has intended meaning and performed something. And perlocutionary act is the effect of the result that achieved from sentence or utterance by the speaker to the listener.

For example: "Buy 1 Free 1." The society think if people buy 1, they will get free 1. This sentence marked that the sentence is locutionary act. But, for advertiser the sentence have intended meaning. For advertiser, the sentence used to invite attention the society to buy a product by give offering. This sentence marked that the sentence is illocutionary act. And the effects the society buy a product. This sentence marked that the sentence is perlocutionary act.

In this study, perlocutionary act do not discuss in this study because do not has related about a study. And Coulthard, (1985: 19) states that “Austin himself expected the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts to give more trouble. Basically an illocutionary act is a linguistic act performed in uttering certain words in a given context, while a perlocutionary act is a non-linguistic act performed as a consequence of performing the locutionary and illocutionary acts.”

The locutionary act has relation with illocutionary act. To understand meaning of illocutionary act, firstly, the society should be understands of sentence used in locutionary act. In book *Critical Theory Since 1965* compose Adams and Searle, (1986: 835) that “Austin’s statement to perform a locutionary act is in general, we may so, to perform an illocutionary act, as I propose to call it. Thus in performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing such an act as:

asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description.

This is argues that locutionary act has related illocutionary act. But, the locutionary act is in general and literal meaning. To know the sentence or utterance has intended meaning and performing, so, illocutionary act is actually used.

According the theory above, Coulthard and Jurafsky and Martin classifying the illocutionary act into five classes. For more clear, will explained into paragraphs below.

This research, will analyze the class of the illocutionary act of advertisements found in *Jawa Pos* Saturday April 28, 2012 with using the Searle’s theory in book *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis* by Coulthard because in this theory more specific

than others. And Coulthard states that “Austin’s theory is suggestive, but he died before he was able to develop it. One significant gap is that whereas he proposed four conditions governing the ‘happy’ production of ritual or archetypical performatives, he suggested no conditions or rules for other performatives. Searle (1965) attempts, through a detailed discussion of one conventional illocutionary act, ‘promise’, to explicate the notion of illocutionary act by stating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act and extracting from it a set of semantical rules for the use of the expression (or syntactic device) which marks the utterance as an illocutionary act of that kind.” (Coulthard, 1985: 20-21).

He chooses not to separate an utterance into locutionary act and illocutionary acts, preferring to see it as consisting of two (not necessarily separate or even separable) parts: a *proposition*, and a *function indicating device* which marks the illocutionary force. In each the following utterances, Searle suggests, the speaker expresses the same proposition, that John will leave the room – that is, he predicates the action of leaving the room of John, though only in the second does he perform the illocutionary act of ‘asserting’:

Will John leave the room?

John will leave the room.

John, leave the room!

If John will leave the room I will leave also.

The function-indicating devices in English include word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb and finally the set of so-called performative verbs, but in the 1965 article he confines his discussion ‘to full-blown explicit promises and ignores promises made by elliptical turns of phrase, hints,

metaphors, etc'. In other words, his concern is not with deciding whether and how a potentially ambiguous utterance is interpretable as a promise but with how an utterance of the form 'I promise that *p*' can 'happily' secure uptake as a promise.

Before he can clarify the nature of the rules which govern the linguistic realization of illocutionary acts, Searle needs to distinguish the two major types of rule, *regulative* and *constitutive*. Regulative rules, as the name implies, are concerned with conditions on the occurrence of certain forms of behavior – 'Children are forbidden to play football on the grass': whereas constitutive rules define the behavior itself – 'A player is offside if...'. If the children ignore the notice they will be playing football, though incidentally breaking the law; if they ignore the offside rule they are technically no longer playing football, for football has no existence apart from its constitutive rules.

In the study of language use both sets of rules are important. All interaction has regulative rules, usually not explicitly stated, which govern greetings, choice of topic, interruption and so on, and as Hymes (1972a) points out, the rules vary from community to community. Constitutive rules in speech are those which control the ways in which an utterance of a given form is heard as realizing a given illocutionary act. Searle's aim is to describe the constitutive rules for the illocutionary act of *promising*. He suggests that five rules govern the making of a promise:

*propositional content rule* – in a promise, a future act must be predicated of the speaker himself; he cannot promise to have done something nor promise that someone else will do something.

*preparatory rules (a)* – a promise is defective if the promiser does not believe that the promisee wants the act performed or even if the thing promised is, unbeknown to the promiser, something the promisee does not want done – otherwise whatever his

intention the speaker will be uttering a warning or threat. (b) – a speaker cannot promise to do something he would (be expected to) do anyway – as Searle observes, any husband who promises his wife not to be unfaithful during the next week is likely to provide more anxiety than comfort.

*sincerity rule* – the speaker must intend to perform the action. It is of course possible for someone to make a promise with no intention at all of honouring it, but then, Searle contends, he is abusing the procedure.

*essential rule* – the uttering of the words counts as the undertaking of an obligation to perform the action.

A major difference between Austin and Searle lies in the assignment of the illocutionary force of an utterance – as we saw above for Austin, it is the successful realization of the speaker's intention, but for Searle a product of the listener's interpretation. Preparatory rule (a) makes this clear and provides for the speaker saying 'I promise I will be there by three o'clock', feeling certain in his own mind that he has committed himself and yet unwittingly having performed the illocutionary acts of 'warning' or 'threatening', because the hearer does not in fact want him to be there by three o'clock.

Searle observes that for his analysis to have any general interest the analytic framework should be adaptable to the description of other speech acts, and in Searle (1969) he offers an analysis of 'request', 'assert', 'question', 'thank', 'advise', 'warn' and 'order'. For ordering, the *propositional content* must be a future act by the hearer,

the *preparatory* conditions include that the speaker should be in a position of authority over the hearer, the *sincerity* condition is that the speaker wants the ordered act done and the *essential* condition has to do with the fact that the speaker intends the utterance as an attempt to get the hearer to do the act.

In analyzing the set of illocutionary acts Searle noted that certain conditions recurred, and this led him to question whether there were ‘some basic illocutionary acts to which all or most of the others are reducible’. Austin had in fact tentatively proposed grouping his performative verbs into five major classes: *verdictives*, typified by the giving of a verdict by a jury, arbitrator or umpire—acquit, grade, estimate, diagnose; *exercitives*, which are the exercising of powers, rights or influence—appoint, order, advise, warn; *commissives*, which commit the speaker to doing something, but also include declarations or announcements of intention—promise, guarantee, bet, oppose; *behabitives*, a miscellaneous group concerned with attitudes and social behavior—apologize, criticize, bless, challenge; and *expositives*, which clarify how they are being used—argue, postulate, affirm, concede.

However, there are problems with this classification, as Searle (1976) points out: ‘there is no clear or consistent principle or set of principles on the basis of which the taxonomy is constructed’, and therefore ‘a very large number of verbs find themselves smack in the middle of two competing “categories” – for example, Austin lists ‘describe’ as both a verdictive and an expositive. However, the fundamental weakness of Austin’s classification of illocutionary verbs is that it is just that, a classification of illocutionary verbs. As Searle comments, ‘Austin seems to assume that a classification of different verbs is *eo ipso* a classification of kinds of illocutionary acts.’ In other words, Austin’s classification is essentially a folk-linguistic one – it relies on the English language for its descriptive labels and therefore includes speech acts which the language happens to lexicalize, omitting those for which there is no lexical label. This means that on the one hand ‘I order you to’, ‘I request you to’, ‘I beg you to’, ‘I entreat you to’ are necessarily regarded as different illocutionary acts, though all could be expansions of the same primary performative ‘put down that gun’ uttered by speakers with differing status relative to



their addressee; while on the other hand, whereas one can report both ‘I complimented her’ and ‘I insulted her’, only the former can be classified as a report of an illocutionary act.

Searle argues that it is much more reasonable to think of speakers as performing a limited number of illocutionary acts and to see the illocutionary *verbs* as semantic complexes carrying other information in addition to force – thus request or beg or entreat are concerned with differences in the relative status of speaker and hearer, suggest or purpose or insist with variation in the strength with which the illocutionary point is presented, and boast or lament and congratulate or console with ‘differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer’.

One exciting consequence of this proposal, which Searle himself does not mention, is that it provides a solution to the problem of expanding primary performatives. The hearer or analyst does not have to decide which of more than 1000 performative verbs is the correct expansion, but only to which class the utterance belongs; all the other information will either be available in the context or co-text or situationally unimportant – thus there is now a principled explanation for the synonymy in Austin’s expansion ‘I declare, pronounce, give or call you out’.

Searle argues that there are three major ways in which speech acts can vary:

1. They can differ in the way in which they fit words to the world – he notes that some ‘illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (or more strictly their propositional content) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the former category and requests in the latter’.
2. They can differ in terms of the psychological state they express – here he uses ‘believe’, ‘want’ and ‘intend’ as primitives, arguing that stating or explaining

involves ‘believing that *p*’, promising involves ‘intending that *p*’ and ordering ‘wanting that *p*’.

3. They can differ in terms of point or purpose – this is the most important criterion of the three and corresponds to the *essential* condition in his earlier analysis.

Using these three dimensions, Searle proposes five macro-classes of illocutionary act: representatives, directives, commissives, expressive, and declarations.

- **Representatives**, the point or purpose is to ‘commit the speaker to something being the case’—in other words, it is an utterance in which the speaker fits his words to the world and which incorporates his ‘BELIEF.’ The degree of belief can obviously vary between ‘swear’, ‘suggest’, and ‘hypothesize’ and affective features can be incorporated as in ‘boast’ and ‘complain.’

For example: What time is it? It is four o’clock.

- **Directives**, are all attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something – in this class the speaker is WANTING to achieve a future situation in which the world will match his words and thus this class includes not simply ‘order’ and ‘request’ but, more subtly, ‘invite’, ‘dare’, and ‘challenge.’

What can I do to help? Open the door.

- **Commissives**, a category taken over intact from Austin, are like directives concerned with altering the world to match the words, but this time the point is commit the speaker himself to acting and it necessarily involves INTENTION.

For example: Can you help us? I will give you a cake.

- **Expressives**, is much less well defined – there is no dynamic relationship between words and world and no primitive psychological verb. Instead ‘the illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content.’ As examples he offers ‘thank’, ‘apologize’ and ‘deplore.’

For example: Will you forgive me for my mistake? Of course yes.

- **Declarations**, consists of acts which in the uttering alter the world and includes many of those which Austin first considered as performatives. They typically require an extra-linguistic institution which provides rules for their use – a court, committee, church, rule book – except for the special case of declarations concerned with language use itself: ‘I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub.’

For example: sentence in the declaring war, christening, baptizing, marrying.

In addition, Jurafsky and Martin, (2000: 728) that “The term speech act is generally used to describe illocutionary acts rather than either of the other two levels. Searle (1975b), in modifying a taxonomy of Austin’s, suggest that all speech acts can be classified into one of five major classes:

- **Assertives:** committing the speaker to something’s being the case (suggesting, putting forward, swearing, boasting, concluding).
- **Directives:** attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (asking, ordering, requesting, inviting, advising, begging).
- **Commissives:** committing the speaker to some future course of action (promising, planning, vowing, betting, opposing).
- **Expressives:** expressing the psychological state of the speaker about a state of affairs thanking, apologizing, welcoming, deploring.
- **Declarations:** bringing about a different state of the world via the utterance (including many of the performative examples above; I resign, You’re fired).

According the theories above, Jurafsky and Martin’s theory classifying illocutionary act into five classes. There are assertives, directives, commissives, expressive, and declarations. And Coulthard’s theory classifying the illocutionary act into five classes with the different philosophers. The philosopher Austin there are veridictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives. The philosopher Searle there are representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaration.

In Jurafsky and Martin's theory and Coulthard's theory has similar in classifying the classes. It because the philosopher used in Jurafsky and Martin's theory and Coulthard's theory is same, that is, John Searle. Four classes are same there are directives, commissives, expressive, and declarations. And one class the different that is assertives in Jurafsky and Martin's theory and representatives in Coulthard's theory.

Based on the theories above, the Searle's theory (Coulthard, 1985: 24-25) will be used in this research to answer the problem.

The sentences of advertisements are analyzed based on the classes of illocutionary act with using Searle's theory (Coulthard, *ibid*) that divides five classes, they are: representatives, directives, commissives, expressive, and declarations.